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Abraham Lincoln and Unionism in East Tennessee
Often, the American Civil War finds itself painted in classrooms across the
country as a conflict of clear-cut ideologies in the North and South. The citizens of the
northern states wished to preserve the sacred Union, and northern forces fought
valiantly while invading a rebellious South. The Unionists of eastern Tennessee put to
rest the false generalization that all southerners were loyal to the Confederate States of
America, as their struggle throughout the war on the behalf of the Union was a long and
bloody event. On June 8, 1861, Tennessee voted to secede from the United States. The
vote was far from unanimous, as 66 percent of the eligible voters of east Tennessee
showed their northern tastes by voting to remain in the Union. Much to the dismay of
these loyal Unionists, eastern Tennessee was soon brought under the control of the
Confederacy. It was not until 1863 that a federal army entered eastern Tennessee, a full
two years after the June of 1861 declaration of secession.1 President Abraham Lincoln
heard the cry of the eastern Tennessean Unionists even prior to the state’s secession; the
delay of liberation for the East was not from a lack of sympathies from the President.
Lincoln wished to intervene quickly on the behalf of eastern Tennessee for both the
protection of loyalists and the capture of a strategically important area, but an invading
Union army was held back by non-cooperating Union generals. Indeed, pro-Union
forces in east Tennessee created a situation that the Confederate government was
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unfamiliar with. Where most of the war was fought between North and South, the
violence in east Tennessee was between neighbors. This violence was unlike anything
else seen in the war, as the relative geographic isolation of east Tennessee led to a civil
war inside the Civil War. The guerrilla warfare and subsequent bloody crackdown of
Unionists created a difficult and unusual situation for the governments of both sides of
the conflict to tackle.
East Tennessee differed from the rest of Tennessee in many ways. The
Cumberland Plateau separated the East from the West, forming a geological barrier that
created a sense of independence for the eastern Tennesseans. Where the Democrats
held influence in the middle and western parts of the state, the Whigs held political
power in the East. Eastern Tennesseans also held far less agricultural prowess as the two
other regions of the state did, which worked to further separate the cultures of the state.
The easterners held their own railroad system that ran from the North to the South. The
railroad failed to run East to West, where it would have connected all three regions of
the state. Slavery played perhaps the largest role in a separate eastern culture as slaves
contributed to only 9.2 percent of east Tennessee’s population, compared to the rest of
the state whose population hovered around one-third enslaved.2
The East showed their independence as tension began to mount in Tennessee,
even prior to the June 8, 1861 secession referendum. Leading Unionists united at the
Knoxville Convention to declare the illegality of secession, and also proposed the
possibility of creating their own state loyal to the Union.3 When Tennessee broke from
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the United States, prominent Unionists from the East quickly showed the effects of their
distinct culture. Andrew Johnson remained in his seat in the Senate. Knoxville printers
such as William G. Brownlow continued to push out pro-Union rhetoric, and
congressman Thomas A.R. Nelson used his pre-war popularity to rally easterners for the
Union.4 Nelson in his speeches, according to the Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, spoke
of “his unalterable attachment to the Union, denied the right of Secession, and
repudiated the slavery agitation of the North.”5 The Boston Daily Advertiser described
the eastern Tennesseans as “resolute anti-secessionists” who displayed “unconditional
Unionism.”6 Elections soon ran in Tennessee, and in several eastern districts pro-Union
congressmen were elected. These congressmen, in an act of defiance to their
Confederate oppressors, attempted to journey to Washington to join the United States
Senate, instead of its Confederate counterpart.7
President Lincoln knew of the forthcoming difficulties the Unionists faced even
prior to Tennessean secession. On May 14, 1861, Lincoln received a letter from former
Tennessee legislator John B. Rodgers that cited that Union men were now subject to
persecution if they spoke out against the Confederacy. Rodgers described the east
Tennessean’s situation as a “deplorable one… The Union men are now threatened with
personal violence.”8 The Unionists steadfast support of the Union did indeed provoke
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the loathing of their neighbors. As the election for governor rolled around in the state in
late 1862, eastern Tennesseans once again showed their Unionist flavors by voting for
the anti-secession candidate. This, coupled with the fact that the previously elected
Unionists representatives for Congressional seats had made it to the United States of
America Congress, showed Confederate leadership that the East was not to be trusted in
governing itself. The acting governor of the state begged CSA president, Jefferson Davis,
for troops to keep the eastern half of the state in order. For the Confederacy, control of
eastern Tennessee was vital to the war effort. The idea of rebellion inside southern land
frightened Confederate leaders. Far from being only a nuisance that would require
troops diverted from the war front, the strategic and economic importance of the east
portion of the state could not be understated. The eastern half of the state was an
important producer of cattle, hogs, flour, and salt that would go to a rebel force that
needed all the provisions it could muster.9 The Confederates also desperately needed
control of the railroad that ran through east Tennessee. The railroad connected the
capital of the Confederacy, Richmond, to the rest of the entire South. Union control of
the east portion of the state, or even acts of sabotage by Unionists inside of the state
would spell disaster for Southern railway supply lines. The “Keystone of the Southern
Arch” was a popular title for eastern Tennessee, a title well deserved. 10
The 14,000 troops that Jefferson Davis sent at the request of the governor did
little to prevent Unionists in eastern Tennessee from speaking out against the

http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/alhome.html, accessed [September 13th, 2017]
9

Martha L. Turner "The Cause of the Union in East Tennessee." Tennessee Historical Quarterly 40,
no. 4 (1981): 370.
10
“On Dissent in Eastern Tennessee,” Richmond Enquirer, December 19, 1861.

5
Confederacy. In the fall of 1861, a native son of Tennessee, Confederate brigadier
general Felix K. Zollicoffer, was given military oversight of east Tennessee. Zollicoffer
attempted to pursue a policy of leniency with the loyal Unionists, in hope that if the
Confederacy kept out of their affairs, the Unionists would comply with a non-violent
Confederate occupation. The hope was that eastern Tennesseans would be swayed to
join the CSA, and Zollicoffer was tasked with the difficult job of convincing Unionists to
abandon the Union. The conversion of the Unionists to the Confederate failed, as even
with Zollicoffer’s urgings, easterners continued to voice their support of the Union
cause. William G. Brownlow’s Knoxville Whig was a prominent catalyst for Union
dissent. Brownlow continued to urge open acts of defiance against Confederate control,
and informed his reader to prepare for war within the region. In one issue of the Whig
he urged “all man, women, and child” to prepare for, “a great battle against the
Confederate scourge.” In another he labeled all secessionists as, “the negro-worshiping
aristocracy [and] the cotton and tobacco-planting lord.” Brownlow’s criticism of the
Confederacy led to his arrest on December 6, 1861 as Confederate forces began a
crackdown on pro-Union publications.11 The Confederacy tightened its grip on the
eastern part of the state, censoring the press and preventing the meeting of small
groups, other than those out in the open in full support of the Confederacy.
Lincoln stood strong in his urgency for liberating the Unionists as military
leaders in the West put their focuses elsewhere. The East’s strategic significance did not
escape the President or others in the northern government. The possibility of cutting off
the southern supply line and gaining control of the railroad would go a long way to

11

About Brownlow’s Knoxville Whig (Knoxville, 1868), The Library of Congress. Tennessee
University. 17 December 2017. <https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn99065841/>

6
halting southern operations. It would also be vital to cutting off the capital of Richmond
from the rest of the South, allowing Union forces a better chance to capture the capital.
The President also promoted eastern Tennessee’s strategic significance to the North, as
gaining control of the East would mean control of its crops and livestock, as well as the
railways needed to supply troops with these provisions as the Union armies marched
through the South. In fact, the recapture of eastern Tennessee became somewhat of a
pet project for Lincoln.12 The President was motivated by his military and economic
reasons, yet he also possessed a desire to end the suffering of the loyalists in east
Tennessee. Freeing these loyalists from southern control would also mean the possibility
of more Union reinforcements from eastern Tennessee.
It was in the fall of 1861 that Lincoln’s wishes came to fruition, as William B.
Carter of Tennessee proposed a plan to cut off the railroad supply lines that Lincoln so
wished to see severed. The plan would see eastern Unionists rebel in full force and burn
nine railroad bridges running through Tennessee. At the same time, the forces under
General Don Carlos Buell would invade from the North. The sabotage of the bridges
would deal a massive blow to the Confederacy, as the railroad from Richmond to
Atlanta, Charlotte, and New Orleans would not be able to make up for the strength in
transport that the eastern Tennessean line held. Carter presented the plan to Lincoln in
September of the year, and the President happily obliged to approve the process. In
November, a small group of Unionists men moved on their targets and attacked the
railroad bridges. The Unionists were successful in burning five of the eight bridges, but
were taken by surprise by Confederate forces at the other three. Buell failed to lead his
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forces in a subsequent attack, and the Confederates were able to maintain control of the
railway lines. This event triggered all-out violence in eastern Tennessee. Union men
moved to continue their rebellion, and Confederates moved quickly to suppress any
more outbreaks of pro-Union attacks.
Don Carlos Buell’s failure to coincide his attack with the burning of the railway
bridges came from his own self-interest and desire for power, feelings which put
Lincoln’s plans of freeing the Unionists in Tennessee on hold. After Lincoln expressed
his desires to Buell of freeing east Tennessee, Buell proceeded to wait in Kentucky for
months with his troops. When General Don Carlos Buell was given command of the
invasion of Tennessee, he was given firm suggestions by both Lincoln and General-inChief George McClellan to ensure that Buell liberated the struggling Unionists first.
Lincoln desired to send Buell’s army from their encampment in Kentucky, over the
border, and into eastern Tennessee, freeing the Unionists under siege.13 In writing,
Lincoln argued to Buell that the President would prefer “a point on the railroad south of
the Cumberland Gap than to take Nashville, which is not situated on a major east-west
railroad.”14 More importantly, Lincoln argued for the freeing of his Unionist friends in
eastern Tennessee: “My distress is that our friends are being hanged and driven to
despair, and even now I fear are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal
protection. In this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South.” However, it
was the lack of authority that Lincoln commanded over Buell that doomed the prospects
of securing eastern Tennessee quickly, as Lincoln had no official sway over the self-
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interested Buell. Buell’s inaction and dodging letters frustrated the President. Lincoln
would write to Buell on January 6, 1862 that, “Your dispatch of yesterday had been
received, and it disappoints and distresses me.” Although Unionist relief lay just a
hundred miles north, Lincoln could do little to exert his will on the glory-seeking Buell,
who believed that an attack on the Confederate capital of Nashville would cement his
name in greatness much more than the freeing of the Unionists in Tennessee. So, Buell
instead lay in wait in the relative safety of Kentucky, plotting his attack on Nashville
while Unionists were murdered and tortured in east Tennessee.
Following the Unionist attack on railroad bridges on the vital eastern railway line,
Confederate forces began occupying east Tennessee as though it were truly a rebellious
state inside a larger country. Confederate official began panicking as reports of
hundreds of Union men gathering in armed militias were reported around the country
side. The Confederates were convinced that a full Union revolt was happening in the
eastern half of Tennessee, and would do anything to root out the rebellion. Threats were
made to Union men, such as one ad in the Memphis Appeal asking to purchase
thorough-bred bloodhounds, whose sole purpose were to “chase the infernal, cowardly
Lincoln bushwhackers of east Tennessee… (who have taken advantage of the bush to kill
and cripple many good soldiers,) to their haunts and capture them.”15 The bodies of the
suspected Union conspirators of the attack on the railroad bridges hung from tree
branches near the tracks, allowing for passengers to hit them with sticks as they rode
past. The city of Knoxville was place under martial law, and the rights of citizens to their
own personal weapons were taken away. The Confederates also began tracking rebelling
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Unionists with not only bloodhounds, but Indians as well. Other Unionists were simply
torn from their homes, beaten severely, and left for dead. On some occasions, a whole
neighborhood would be arrested for their suspected allegiance to the Union. Overall,
between 2,000 and 3,000 Union civilians were murdered in east Tennessee due to their
loyalty to the Union and disdain for the Confederacy.16 This purge of Union
sympathizers reached its height in the weeks and months following the burning of the
railway bridges, as Confederate forces worked to scare potential Unionists away from
attempting any more acts of rebellion.
While conditions in east Tennessee worsened due to the aforementioned
persecution, Lincoln continued to hear the pleas for action by Unionists. Representative
William B. Carter wrote to Lincoln asking for “20,000 men, 20,000 stand of arms, and a
competent commander,” while also relaying to Lincoln that he hoped not to have to
return to his people “but with little hope that the Government which owes us protection
will save us from the terrible evils which we are threatened.”17 Benjamin A. Prentiss, a
Brigadier General in Illinois, even wrote to Lincoln on the influx of Tennessean refugees,
along with Prentiss’s desire to stage an attack focused on liberating Tennessee.18 Lincoln
sympathized with men such as Carter and Prentiss, and wished to provide aid quickly to
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the loyal Americans. Even as the Unionists waited for federal help that never came, the
loyalists of Tennessee worked to undermine CSA control by forming bushwhacking
units that used guerrilla warfare to harass Confederate forces. These units struck CSA
supply lines and troops, striking fear into Confederate soldiers, while also prompting
even greater persecution of Union citizens by Confederate forces. Wives and family
members of suspected Union men were tortured by southern forces in response to
suspicion of involvement with guerrilla groups. All out local warfare soon spread
throughout east Tennessee was both Union and Confederate marauders began wreaking
havoc on the countryside.
Eastern Tennessee proved to be unlike any other part of the South in the Civil
War. Its northern culture fostered Union values, and in turn created a rebellious state
inside a rebellious Confederacy. However, the Unionists of Tennessee faced persecution
like no other citizens in the Civil War. They were arrested, beaten, and murdered, yet
remained loyal to the United States of America. The Unionists fought their own guerrilla
war, never giving up on the cause of the Union. Indeed, the east Tennesseans worked to
undermine the CSA, even while they saw little support from the federal government.
President Lincoln felt the suffering of the Unionists, and did all in his power to influence
the Union forces to move into Eastern Tennessee and free the Unionists from their
oppression. Lincoln and his associates in the northern government also saw the great
strategic, economic, military value of East Tennessee. Yet, it was the failure of the Union
command and the seeking of personal glory by military officers such as Don Carlos Buell
that doomed the Unionists to two years of occupation. The East bled as Buell decided
that it would be better to conquer an enemy capital than save his own people. Abraham
Lincoln remained helpless to protect the very citizens that he swore he would protect,
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and helpless to secure the railroad line that would help cut off Richmond from the rest
of the South. Andrew Johnson would return to his state as military governor in 1863,
and effectively recaptured Knoxville and Chattanooga, which gave the Unionists hope
that their state was free of Confederate control for good.19 Johnson’s arrival marked the
beginning of the end of the suffering of the east Tennessee Unionists: a suffering that
Buell helped cause on his search for glory, while President Lincoln powerlessly looked
on.

Word Count: 2,894

19

Peter Maslowski. "From Reconciliation to Reconstruction: Lincoln, Johnson, and Tennessee, Part
II." Tennessee Historical Quarterly 42, no. 4 (1983): 347.

12
Bibliography
Ambrose, Stephen E. "The Union Command System and the Donelson
Campaign." Military Affairs 24, no. 2 (1960): 78-86.
Benjamin M. Prentiss, et al. to Abraham Lincoln, May 24, 1861. Transcribed and
annotated by the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois.
Available at Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division (Washington, D.C.: American Memory Project, [2000- 02]),
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/alhome.html, accessed [September 13th,
2017]
Clark, Donald A. "Buell's Advance to Pittsburg Landing: A Fresh Look at an Old
Controversy." Tennessee Historical Quarterly 68, no. 4 (2009): 355-90.
“The Hon. Thos. A.R. Nelson,” Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, May 1, 1861.
John B. Rodgers to Edward Bates, May 14, 1861. Transcribed and annotated by the
Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois. Available at Abraham
Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division (Washington,
D.C.: American Memory Project, [2000- 02]),
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/alhome.html, accessed [September 13th,
2017]
Library of Congress: Chronicling America. Tennessee University. 17 December 2017.
<https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn99065841/>
Maslowski, Peter. "From Reconciliation to Reconstruction: Lincoln, Johnson, and
Tennessee, Part II." Tennessee Historical Quarterly 42, no. 4 (1983): 343-61.
McDonough, James L. "Tennessee and the Civil War." Tennessee Historical
Quarterly 54, no. 3 (1995): 190-209.
“On Dissent in Eastern Tennessee,” Richmond Enquirer, December 19, 1861.
“Notice,” Memphis Appeal, November 21, 1861.
Sheeler, J. Reuben. "Secession and The Unionist Revolt." The Journal of Negro
History 29, no. 2 (1944): 175-85.
Turner, Martha L. "The Cause of the Union in East Tennessee." Tennessee Historical
Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1981): 366-80.
“The Union Spirit in Kentucky,” Boston Daily Adviser, June 27, 1861.
William B. Carter to Abraham Lincoln, August 1, 1861. Transcribed and annotated by
the Lincoln Studies Center, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois. Available at

13
Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division
(Washington, D.C.: American Memory Project, [2000- 02]),
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/alhome.html, accessed [September 13th,
2017
William G. Brownlow, The Knoxville Whig, 1861-1862.

